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FOR RELEASE AT 12:00 O'CLOCK NOON
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1963

FLOOR STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN STENNIS
CHAIRMAN, PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

RE: INTERIM REPORT ON MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF
PROPOSED LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY.

Mr. President:

The Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, of which I am Chairman, has today filed with the Committee on Armed Services an interim report on the military implications of the proposed limited test ban treaty. The report is also being released to the press and the public.

The report is the product of an extensive and exhaustive inquiry by the Subcommittee into the military and technical aspects of the various nuclear test ban proposals. During the inquiry, which commenced last September, testimony was received from 24 witnesses. Among them were many of the most informed and knowledgeable persons in the nation in this field. A broad range of testimony was received from both scientific and military experts and from both proponents and opponents of the treaty.

The overall purpose of the inquiry was to develop as fully and factually as possible the available military and technical information bearing on the subject matter to insure that the Senate would have available to it essentially the same body of military and technical evidence as is available to the Executive Branch in its formulation of nuclear test ban policies. After the negotiation of the Moscow treaty the Subcommittee focused its attention on the potential impact of that treaty upon the future of our military establish-

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ment and strategic forces.

The interim report is directed specifically to the partial test ban agreement and the military advantages and disadvantages which flow or might flow from it. Political considerations and matters of foreign and international affairs, as such, are not within the scope of the report.

The report discusses, within the limits of security classification, the military, technical and security problems which are associated with the treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater.

The report is signed by all members of the Subcommittee except Senator Saltonstall. The Senators so signing the report are myself, as Chairman, and Senators Symington, Jackson, Thurmond, Smith and Goldwater. Senator Saltonstall, who declined to sign the report, filed a dissenting view. Additional views were filed by Senator Symington. These are included with the report.

From the testimony which the Subcommittee heard it was abundantly clear that the ratification of the treaty would result in some military and technical disadvantages and risks for this nation. Indeed there was little controversy on this point. There was, however, considerable divergence of opinion among the witnesses as to the extent and effect of the risks and disadvantages and as to whether they are acceptable on balance. Some of the witnesses viewed the risks and disadvantages as being of a minor nature and as being fully acceptable from the standpoint of our nation's security. Others assessed them as being of serious and major proportions.

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Among the military disadvantages associated with the treaty discussed in the report are the following:

1. The United States probably will be unable to duplicate Soviet achievements in very high yield weapon technology.

2. The United States will be unable to acquire necessary data on the effects of very high yield atmospheric explosions.

3. The United States will be unable to acquire data on high altitude weapons effects.

4. The United States will be unable to determine with confidence the performance and reliability of any ABM system developed without benefit of atmospheric operational system tests.

5. The United States will be unable to verify the ability of its hardened second-strike missile systems to survive close-in high-yield nuclear explosions.

6. The United States will be unable to verify the ability of its missile re-entry bodies under defensive nuclear attack to survive and to penetrate to the target without the opportunity to test nose cone and warhead designs in a nuclear environment under dynamic re-entry conditions.

7. The treaty will provide the Soviet Union with an opportunity to equal U.S. accomplishments in sub-megaton weapon technology.

8. The treaty will deny to the United States a valuable source of information on Soviet nuclear weapons capabilities.

There were, of course, counter-arguments. It was contended,

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for example, that the Soviets would be equally inhibited. It was accurately asserted that progress could be made in some important areas without the benefit of atmospheric testing and that the test ban would not prevent qualitative improvements being made in our weapon systems either as a result of underground testing or by virtue of non-nuclear technology.

In addition, the testimony was unanimous that, except in the field of high yield weapons, the United States today holds a clear and commanding lead in nuclear weapons and weapon systems. This superiority is said to result from a larger and more diversified stockpile of nuclear weapons, by more numerous, varied and sophisticated delivery systems, and by a greater capacity to produce nuclear materials, weapons and delivery systems. It was strongly urged by some witnesses that the treaty would tend to stabilize this superiority.

As against this, however, we learned from the evidence that the Soviets have overtaken and surpassed us in the design of very high yield nuclear weapons; that they may possess knowledge of weapons effects and anti-ballistic missile programs superior to ours; and that under the terms of the treaty it is entirely possible that they will achieve parity with us in low yield weapon technology. Thus the effect of the treaty is to legalize testing in the area where we deem the Soviets to be inferior - - that, is low yield weapons - - and deny to us the benefits of desirable testing in the higher yield areas where the Soviets are or may be superior.

After carefully weighing all of the evidence, the majority of the

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Subcommittee has concluded that the proposed treaty will affect adversely the future quality of this nation's arms, and that it will result in serious, and perhaps formidable, military and technical disadvantages. Any military and technical advantages which we will derive from the treaty do not, in the judgment of the majority, counter-balance or outweigh the military and technical disadvantages. It appears that the Soviets will not be inhibited to the same extent in those areas of nuclear weaponry where we now deem them to be inferior.

Admittedly, however, other factors, which are not within the scope of the Subcommittee report, are pertinent to a final judgment on the treaty. Among these are matters relating to international affairs, foreign policy and our relations with other countries. As the report states, when these are taken into consideration, each individual must reach his own judgment on the basis of personal philosophy, past experience, current knowledge, and the relative weight which he assigns to the various factors involved.

Another matter discussed in the report are the "safeguards" upon which the Joint Chiefs of Staff conditioned their approval of the treaty, and which are designed to reduce to a minimum the adverse effect of the treaty upon our weapon programs. The Subcommittee considers it to be vital that, if the treaty is ratified, these safeguards be implemented to the maximum extent. We have already asked for and received c ertain assurances from the Administration with respect to these safeguards but have not received the detailed information which we feel should be furnished.

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If the treaty is ratified it is the intent of the Subcommittee to monitor the implementation of the safeguards on a regular basis.

However, as is said in the report, even the most thorough implementation of the safeguards will not reduce the military and technical disadvantages of the treaty. No safeguard can provide the benefits of testing where testing is prohibited and none can assure that this nation will acquire the highest quality weapon systems of which it is capable when the means for achieving that objective are denied.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I would like to read a few passages from the Subcommittee report. They are:

> "In considering the impact and effect of the proposed test ban it is important to remember that for nearly two decades this nation has been confronted by an adversary who has openly and repeatedly claimed that his dominant goal is to destroy the nations of the non-Communist world. Only because we have maintained clear military superiority and the ability to inflict unacceptable damage upon him has the would-be aggressor been deterred. The basis of our deterrence is military superiority which, in turn, is based on our nuclear weapon programs and nuclear retaliatory forces.
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> "It is vital to our survival that no step be taken which in any manner would impair the integrity and credibility of our deterrence or degrade the ability of our military forces to protect our security if we should be challenged militarily by a hostile nuclear power."

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